| 05 |
SUMMARY |
| 05/184 |
The VT incident was born out of the nefarious will of an individual determined to terrorize
and destroy the lives of many. It makes utterly no difference whether that individual
was mentally ill; incapacitated or harboring hatred -- the fact that this individual
(or for that matter, any individual) could easily access relevant VT buildings and provoke
mass casualties of the sort obviously demonstrated the unhindered ability in carrying
on terrorist attacks ; |
| 05/185 |
As judiciously ascertained in this Legal Report, VT was made fully aware or was in the
obligation to be fully aware of possible threats and consequences of domestic terrorism.
This Legal Report underlines -- between 1993 through April 16. 2007 -- liability issues
VT would face when confronted with defective premises and redundant campus security
policies. How VT suffered a Level II incident has already been generously ascertained
in the various VA State / VT Reports -- why VT egregiously failed to a prevent an act of
terrorism is a legitimate question this Legal Report attempts to elucidate ; |
|
Key Indicators |
| 05/186 |
Careful scrutiny of relevant indicia contained in this Legal Report provides the reasonable
and well-informed person the means to connect the dots and draw the line as to why
the State of Virginia and VT both failed in securing procedural and substantive safeguards
recognized by international and domestic Law. Inverse analysis of recommendations
proposed in both VA State and VT-sanctioned investigative Reports also reveals
overwhelming evidence of governing deficiencies in the planning and maintenance of
structural security integrity and adequate emergency planning against man-made disasters
such as Level II incidents involving acts of terrorism and mass casualties ; |
| 05/187 |
The perpetrator who instigated the attacks on April 16 was 23 year old Seung-Hui Cho,
a South Korean-born VT student who had an interest in Engineering studies.
Comparing similarly situated circumstances can be revealing: Another South Koreanborn
VT student of the name Yong Ki Kwon, an Engineer, was indicted and sentenced
by a Virginia Court for, inter alia, conspiracy to commit terrorist attacks against the U.S.
(See: http://www.eqrolc.ca/vatcom.shtml#vajihad).
That individual collaborated with
other Virginia-based Jihadists well known to Federal and VA State authorities. The
name of one Va Jihadist AL-Qaeda supporter was known as Randall Todd "Ismail"
Royer. A package sent to NBC -- comprised of Cho's manifesto -- contained the name
"A. Ishmael" as Sender ("Ishmael" and "Ismail" are same, and according to muslim
scholars, are symbols of sacrifice.) ; |
| 05/188 |
Haunting indicia common to both aforementioned South Koreans simply cannot be
ignored: They were VT students of same nationality; both related to Engineering studies;
both shared interest with "Ismail/Ishmael" (one teamed with a Va Jihadist called
"Ismail" -- the other had the words "Ishmael" inscribed on his arm); both were from
Fairfax County; and both were inclined to provoke mass casualty attacks (one is currently
jailed for conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism -- the other committed suicide
after slaying 32 lives and wounding 25 others on Jewish Holocaust Memorial day, Date
for Yom Hashoah: April 16, 2007) ; |
| 05/189 |
It would be absolute foolishness to argue that VA State and VT administration were both
unaware or have not have been made aware of the dangers of any form of domestic terrorism
within their relevant jurisdictions -- Virginia Jihad Network associates of Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LeT - a terrorist organization linked to Al-Qaeda) were under police surveillance
since 2002 and subsequently charged and brought to justice for their role in conspiring and
abetting acts of terrorism against the U.S.
(See: http://www.eqrolc.ca/vatcom.shtml#vajihad);
FEMA, the DOE and DHS sent Advisories to their respective constituents warning
them to prepare against any possible terrorist attack
(See:
http://www.eqrolc.ca/vatcom.shtml#doeterro);
Governor Kaine endorsed a NIMS-compliant
Emergency Response Plan
(See: http://www.eqrolc.ca/vatleg.shtml#vageo44) ; |
| 05/190 |
VT Annual Security Report (2006) provides that "At times it may be necessary for
'timely warnings' to be issued to the university community. If a crime(s) occur and notification
is necessary to warn the university of a potential dangerous situation then the
Virginia Tech Police Department should be notified. The police department will then
prepare a release and the information will be disseminated to all students, faculty and
staff and to the local community" yet on April 16, 2007, an ill-suited multi-level chain
of command was adopted across the VT Board -- in the case of any emergency requiring
timely warnings, the Director of Campus Security and Chief of Police first had to
report to the Vice President for Administrative Services who in turn had to report to the
Executive Vice President who then consulted with a Policy Group before relaying back
a decision to the source ; |
| 05/191 |
The latest version of the VT Emergency Response Plan (the "ERP"), dated 2005, hints on
an onerous decision-making process and ill-suited structure of command which compounded
the impediment of ground-level life-saving efforts of first responders. The first
VT shooting incident reflected a Level I decision-making process that excluded a suicide
but involved a double-murder with the murderer still on the loose. According to the ERP,
the proper Level I response suggests that "The ERP would not typically be activated for
Level I emergencies." therefore the VT Chief of Police should have enjoyed the supervising
role of dessiminating timely warnings to the university community and ensure that
"Security procedures ... need ... be established to protect occupants, evacuees, and/or
property" as mentioned in the ERP and according to the "timely warning" policy of the
VT Annual Security Report 2006. Because of the inconsistent rationale behind the crimes
at West Ambler Johnston Hall and the inconclusive position VTPD took regarding the
unsolved double-murder as of the subsequent decision-making interoperability plan subsequently
implemented between the VTPD and VT, a Level I reaction with Level II implications
had been drawn -- the burden to provide the university community for timely warnings
fatally resting on the supervising ability of the VT administration. As exemplified in
the Report of the VTRP :
|
| 05/192 |
"The police did not have the capability to use the university alerting system to send a warning
to the students, staff, and faculty. That is, they were not given the keyword to operate
the alerting system themselves, but rather they had to request a message be sent from the
Policy Group or at least the associate vice president for University Relations, who did have
the keyword. The police did have the authority to request that a message be sent, but did
not request that be done. They gave the university administration the information on the
incident, and left it to the Policy Group to handle the messaging." |
| 05/193 |
"The university administration failed to notify students and staff of a dangerous situation in
a timely manner. The first message sent by the university to students could have been sent
at least an hour earlier and been more specific. The university could have notified the
Virginia Tech community that two homicides of students had occurred and that the shooter
was unknown and still at large. The administration could have advised students and staff to
safeguard themselves by staying in residences or other safe places until further notice."
[VTRP Report, p. 87 - http://www.eqrolc.ca/vatleg.shtml#vtrp] |
| 05/194 |
According to the DHS, "A balance must be struck between the ability to adapt procedures
based on the situation and the need to standardize them. However, the urgency and circumstances
of an incident often demand decisions and actions. Waiting for complete
knowledge of the situation can have serious consequences, as well." (See: NIMS
Compliance Guide - http://www.eqrolc.ca/vatcom.shtml#femagov). |
| 05/195 |
Although the emergency notification system allowed for an audible message, a protocol for
how to respond when the siren is activated was not in place prior to April 16, 2007. Also,
outdoor loudspeakers adjacent Norris Hall initially announced to "find shelters immediately"
over 3 hours after the first shooting incident (over 45 minutes after the second shooting
incident / hear: R. E. Denton - http://www.eqrolc.ca/player/VTProfRDent.wav). Email notification
of text alerts -- initially made available more than two hours after the double murder
at West Ambler Johnston Hall -- were void of any informative content prescribed by
Law and arrived too little, too late at their target destinations. An overwhelming majority of subscriber-based recipients of email alerts would have never
guessed to access any form of timely text-based warning without intercepting prior visual
and/or audio announcement of the existance of their publication ; |
| 05/196 |
Events prior to Norris Hall mass shooting offer hints of a planned attack: Bomb threats
aimed at Torgersen, Durham and Whittemore Halls -- encountered between April 1 thru 13,
2007 -- may have been a staged provocation aimed at testing the security response; the
04.16.07 West Ambler Johnston Hall double-murder provoked a fatal diversion sufficent
enough to deflect police activity away from the site (Norris Hall) of the planned massacre ; |
|
Conclusions |
| 05/197 |
For a variety of reasons, VA State and Virginia Tech failed to capitalize on both the individual
and collective significance of available information that appears relevant to the
events of April 16, 2007. As a result, VA State and Virginia Tech missed opportunities
to disrupt the April 16 plot through heeding of warnings from legal authorities and specialists
in the field of Campus Security; timely implementation of security measures
advised by FEMA including the DOE and DHS; timely enactment of relevant State legislative
measures; timely attempts at unravelling the plot through surveillance and other
investigative work within the university community; and, finally, through timely warnings
to the university community which would have provoked a heightened state of alert
hardenning the broad Va Tech and Blacksburg community against a Level II incident. No
one may ever know what might have happened had timely connections been drawn
between the bomb threats and the Perpetrators' motives. We know however that Virginia
Tech administration willfully avoided the diligent implementation of the ERP because of
unfounded fear of possible student panic supposedly witnessed during prior response to
a similar crisis involving an off-campus murderer escapee (Morva incident). The important
point is that Va State; the Virginia Tech Board; and police authorities -- for a variety
of reasons -- egregiously neglected to bring together and fully appreciate a range of
information that could have greatly enhanced their chances of uncovering and preventing
the Attacker's plan to commit an act of terrorism. |
| 05/198 |
Securing the Truth and ensuring Restorative Justice can only be attained through an
independent and impartial judicial hearing whose task of exposing the crux of the matter
would contribute in resolving the question as to why VA State and VT egregiously
neglected to implement and administer valid procedural and substantive safeguards
aimed at securing the broad Va Tech and Blacksburg community against Level II type
incidents involving acts of terrorism and mass casualities. - EQ |
The commitment and energy was evident in the discussions and
the group leader summaries highlighted the following:
focused on issues of crisis management
and the group leaders delivered cogent insights that reflected the collective experience of participants:
